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THE ROLE OF IDEAS IN LEGAL HISTORY
Jay M. Feinman*t
PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT. By G. Edward
White. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Publishing Co. 1978. Pp. xix,
384. $14.50.

During the past decade Professor G. Edward White has been
among the most industrious tillers of the legal history vineyard. In
Patterns ofAmerican Legal Thought he has gathered ten of his essays
and organized them into thematic areas. The effort may seem presumptuous - publishing collected essays is an activity usually reserved for senior scholars - but the explosion of interest in legal
history is so recent that White has achieved a measure of seniority at
a relatively young age. Although the collection may not be necessary, it is convenient; several of the articles have been widely used
and will now be more readily available. Moreover, the collection
interestingly demonstrates the approach and growth of one scholar
and raises (but does not answer) significant issues for legal historiography and, ultimately, for the legal system itself.
The essays in Patterns are organized to develop three themes in
American law and legal history: (I) the importance of scholarly
thought in shaping the course of substantive law; (2) the preeminent
position of the judiciary; and (3) the significance of the Constitution
and its exegesis by the Supreme Court. The themes represent
White's research interests but do not pretend to define the scope of
American legal history. Indeed, White seeks to compensate for what
he sees as the dominance of economic and pluralist explanations of
American law (pp. 16-17), just as those approaches sought to compensate for the almost exclusive study of the Supreme Court and
aspects of technical doctrine. The limitation of scope is admirable,
of course, though it makes this a more difficult book to review. Nevertheless, implicit in White's approach are propositions about historical causation and legal process. After reviewing briefly White's
three themes I identify and comment on the most important of these
propositions and describe an alternative set of propositions that I
find more satisfying.
* Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law, Camden. B.A. 1972,
American University; J.D. 1975, University of Chicago.-Ed.
t I am grateful to Rand Rosenblatt for co=enting on a draft of this review.
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THE PAITERNS

Scholarly Thought

White's principal field of interest is the intellectual history of
American law. Three essays in Patterns explore the role of scholarly
thought in two areas - twentieth century jurisprudence and the rise
of tort law in the nineteenth century. As White acknowledges in his
introduction, his conceptual approach changed between his earlier
writings on the twentieth century and his current work on the origins
of torts. White's earlier approach described a direct causal link between social phenomena and schools of jurisprudence, while his
more recent work concedes the "extraordinarily complex and difficult to characterize" link between events and ideas (p. 97).
In two major essays originally published in the Virginia Law Review, I White traces the development of schools of American jurisprudence in the twentieth century and explores that development's
origins in political phenomena. The dialectical evolution of schools
of jurisprudence is a familiar tale today, in part because of White's
work. The rigid, syllogistic analysis known as Mechanical Jurisprudence dominated legal thought at the end of the nineteenth century.
Roscoe Pound elevated Holmes's critique of that school to the status
of a new jurisprudential movement, which he dubbed "Sociological
Jurisprudence" in 1907. Sociological Jurisprudence moved legal
study away from pure technical analysis by incorporating the insights of the social sciences. By the time the move was firmly underway, however, the social sciences had shifted into new areas, notably
behavioral studies. The legal scholars who adopted the new approach mounted an attack on Sociological Jurisprudence and created a new dominant school: American Legal Realism. By World
War II, in tum, the moral relativism of Realism was itself a point of
weakness, and a renewed emphasis on affirming underlying values
and institutional competence gave rise to Process Jurisprudence,2
which would itself prove inadequate under the extraordinary pressures of the 1960s and the activism of the Warren Court.
According to White's account, the principal impetuses for the rise
and fall of the successive jurisprudential movements lay outside the
legal system, in political movements and events and in trends among
American intellectuals. For example, Pound's Sociological Jurisprudence reflected two social hypotheses of Progressivism: the need for
continuity in change and the utility of law in explicating shared soI. White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in
Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999 (1972); White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 297 (1973).
2. In this essay White deals primarily with Reasoned Elaboration, a school of Supreme
Court criticism which is "a particular canon" of Process Jurisprudence. G. WHITE, THE
AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 404 n.2 (1976).
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cial values. As the optimism of the Progressive movement faded in
the 1920s and the attention of Progressive social scientists shifted to
the study of the human and national psyches, Sociological Jurisprudence was challenged by Realism,, a school reflective of the newer
way of perceiving reality. White describes the social phenomena as
directly generating approaches to social theory, including approaches to legal theory.
White's later essay on the origins of torts3 presents a more complex picture of the interaction between social practice and law. As
the traditional view has it, the law of negligence developed to deal
with accident litigation in a newly industrialized economy without
unduly burdening emergent industry.4 White regards the rise of the
new type of accident as crucial, but only as grist for the intellectual
mill of legal thinkers coincident with other developments in law and
social thought.
Injury as a product of industrialization changed the typical tort
case from one between persons in a close relation to each other to
one between strangers. Suits between strangers encouraged a shift in
the basis of liability from a specific unperformed duty to violation of
a generalized standard of care. Violating such a standard of care
was called negligence and became the basis for the tort cause of action.
But courts did not develop and adopt the negligence principle
merely in response to the novelty of suits between strangers. Courts
and scholars were attempting to develop broad principles of law for
two other reasons. The first was internal; the demise of the writ system required not only procedural change but also a fundamental reorientation of legal thinking. While the writ system existed, it
provided the law's conceptual basis; with its collapse, a new intellectual foundation, based on principles of substantive doctrine, had to
be found. Negligence offered an organizing principle for the law of
private wrongs. The second impetus to doctrinal organization came
from the larger intellectual climate. Victorian intellectuals, recognizing the socially disintegrative capacity of material progress, strove to
articulate general scientific principles with which to order the chaotic
social universe. Legal scholars joined in the effort within their area
of expertise, and two of those most taken with the conceptualist approach, Holmes and Nicholas St.John Green, made major contributions to the. development of torts as a unified field.
White's methodological emphasis in recounting the rise of tort
3. White, The Intellectual Origins oJ Torts in America, 88 YALE L.J. 671 (1977) (p. 163).
This article has been supplemented by a later article, White, The Impact oJ Legal Science on
Tort Law, 1880-1910, 78 CoLUM. L. REV. 213 (1978), and apparently both have been superseded by White's new book on the subject, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY (1980), which I have not considered for the purpose of this review.
4. E.g., L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 261-64, 409-17 (1973).
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law differs from his approach in discussing twentieth century jurisprudence, which he saw as a reflection of political and social events.
In describing the rise of tort law, White portrays a much more complicated causal relation_. Social and economic events provide the raw
material for the legal system, but the raw material is shaped by intellectual conditions of the time. Describing the historical process becomes more difficult when a simple chain of causation is abandoned.
In attempting to resolve the problem of causation in legal history
White first emphasizes scholarly thought. He then proceeds to consider the preeminent position of the judiciary and the significance of
constitutional principles.
B.

The Judiciary

The two essays in White's chapter on the judiciary and the introductory chapter's essay on judicial opinions as historical sources are
suggestive, but they lack the thematic unity of the chapter on legal
scholarship. Each essay presents a different facet of the judicial role.
In ''The Rise and Fall of Justice Holmes," 5 an essay closely related
to the materials on scholarly thought, White describes the changes in
intellectual and popular regard for the venerable Justice. In the essay on Brandeis's influences on administrative law,6 White deals
more directly with the extent of judicial influence on American law
and raises again the problem of historical causation. His essay on
judicial opinions7 summarizes his general thoughts on the judicial
role and its position in the model of causation. Since White has written extensively on "the American judicial tradition" in his book of
that name, 8 Patterns cannot adequately express White's views on the
judiciary without duplicating his other work. These three essays
merely underscore his "conviction that significant contributions to
American legal thought have been made by holders of judgeships,
particularly at the appellate levels" (p. 193). That prosaic belief
hardly seems worth the space devoted to it, but the essays are interesting nevertheless.
Justice Holmes is perhaps the outstanding figure in American legal history. White examines the public and professional regard for
Holm.es as Boston Brahmin, as ideologue, and as judicial stylist,
from his emergence as a preeminent thinker with the publication of
The Common Law in 1881 to the present. The essay is only in minor
part about Holmes, drawing the familiar complex, somewhat" pa5. 39 U. CHI. L. REv. 51 (1971) (p. 194).
6. White, A/localing Power Between Agencies and Courts: The Legacy ofJustice Brandeis,
1974 DUKE L.J. 195.
7. White, The Appellate Opinion as Historical Source Material, 1 J. INTERDIS. HIST. 491
(1971) (p. 74).
8. THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION, supra note 2.
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thetic picture of intellectual radical turned proto-nihilist.9 It is also
only incidentally about the judiciary; Holmes achieved his importance because he served in important judicial positions, but by itself
that is hardly a point of great significance. The essay mostly complements White's work on twentieth century jurisprudence, describing
the changing perception of Holmes by successive groups of intellectuals. It conveys a general impression similar to that left from the
essays on scholarly thought: that political and social events shape
intellectual paradigms, and those paradigms then organize social
and historical reality for their adherents. Thus each successive
school found in Holmes the positive or negative characteristics that
best confirmed its belief structure.
Justice Brandeis receives more direct treatment in the essay discussing the influence of his opinions in shaping the field of administrative law. The article adds to White's methodological calculus the
role important judges play in shaping the law. By the time of Brandeis's appointment to the Supreme Court in 1916, a comprehensive
scheme of governmental regulation of industrial and financial activity had been put in place, but there remained to be developed a body
of law that would define the limits of agency power and the role of
legislative delegation and judicial supervision. White suggests that
Brandeis directed administrative law toward the allocative approach,
which emphasizes the distribution of power between agencies and
courts, rather than the approach of the creators of the administrative
system, which emphasized the issues of delegation and national uniformity.
In terms of historical causation, White perceives Brandeis as acting in an authoritative but scholarly role. Brandeis did not, by
strength of conviction or logic, single-handedly shape the development of administrative law. His legal views, growing out of his political orientation, became persuasive to his Supreme Court colleagues
and others in large part because of the evolving contemporary experience with administrative bodies. By historical coincidence Brandeis was in a position of authority when his analysis was regarded as
helpful in deciding issues arising out of a new reality. So the judge's
role, like the scholar's, is to present a perceptual framework in which
to organize social experience, though at times the judge may be more
successful in doing so because of the greater authority of his opinions.10
White's essay on judicial opinions as historical sources pictures
9. See G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 48-50 (1977).
10. The perceptual framework is important but not determinative. Political, economic,
and social phenomena were primarily responsible for the rise of the administrative state; judicial opinions had only a limited effect on the governmental response to these phenomena, See
notes_ 25-31 infra and accompanying text.
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judges as subject to institutional and role constraints but able to express their political and social inclinations. Thus he suggests a historical method that first identifies a judicial ratiocinative style
common to a period and then correlates the style and its social assumptions with modes of discourse in other disciplines, values of political and social movements, and prevailing cultural attitudes.
White illustrates the method with MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 11
Justice Cardozo's opinion in MacPherson reflected the Progressive
ideal of social reform with institutional continuity; the opinion
changed the law of manufacturers' liability by purporting to reconcile, not overrule, precedents. Again, White describes legal thought
as mirroring social and intellectual trends within the limits of the
judicial office. 12
~
C.

The Constitution

White's chapter on the judiciary is less thematically coherent
than his chapter on scholarly thought; the final chapter, on the Constitution, is less coherent still. The chapter consists of two articles,
neither of ":'hich fulfills the Introduction's promise to discuss how
the presence of a written fundamental law has distinguished the
character of American law. The first essay, 13 a review of Richard
Kluger's Simple Justice, 14 discusses the interaction between the
Supreme Court and its publics, at least attempting to examine the
complexity of legal process. The second piece, "Constitutional Protection for Personal Lifestyles" 15 (with J. Harvie Wilkinson, III), is a
traditional, nonhistorical case analysis that seems to have been included simply to fill out the volume. It no more lends itself to historical discussion than any other representative of its genre. 16
Together the two essays speak little about the significance· of a
written constitution. They do, however, remind us of familiar points
about the Supreme Court's social role in proclaiming constitutional
law. Let me summarize three points:
(1) The public perceives three divergent roles of the Supreme
Court: The Court as "nine people," as "a branch of government,"
and as "the supreme law of the land" (p. 292). To maintain the validity of the higher roles and thereby to avoid the charge of arbitrari11. 217 N.Y. 382 (1916).
12. The interaction of institutional constraints and social ideology in shaping judicial decisions is emphasized by White in THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION, supra note 2.
13. White, The Supreme Court's Public and the Public's Supreme Court, 52 VA. Q. REv. 370
(1976) (p. 290).
14. R. KI.UGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975).
15. 62 CORNELL L. REV. 563 (1977) (p. 308).
16. For an analysis of the genre, see Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An
Interpretation oJ Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEXAS L. REv. 1307 (1979).
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ness, the Court must establish its legitimacy as a governing
institution through the appearance of institutional continuity. To accomplish this, the Court primarily relies on adherence, real or professed, to a system of stare decisis and on appeals to fundamental
values. The tension between roles is most acute when the Court
overrules a precedent (as in Brown v. Board ofEducation 11) or when
it renders a decision not based on a specific constitutional protection
(as in many of the "lifestyle" decisions. 18)
(2) Decisions of the Court both shape and are shaped by contemporary social values. The causal chain is very complicated. By
selecting the cases it hears and decides, and by choosing to express
its opinions in those cases broadly or narrowly, the Court has some
control over the extent of its influence on social values. But the
Court cannot render decisions that stray too far from widely held
values; White and Wilkinson note that this fact limits the Court's
power to protect individual freedom of lifestyle. Still, the Court's
decisions may, as in Brown, lead public opinion and encourage certain values.
(3) The Supreme Court has three publics: the profession, the
informed public, and the laity. In writing opinions (or attacking
opinions in dissent) Justices must speak at different levels to reach
different publics. With rare exceptions, of which Brown may be the
most exceptional, Supreme Court decisions do not penetrate deeply
into the public consciousness. When one does, the lay public and
much of the informed public are probably aware only of the results
and not the reasoning in the opinion. Thus the Court can play only
a limited role in developing social values.
IL

IDEAS AND THE PROBLEM OF CAUSATION

Patterns is not a book that needed to be published. As an anthology, it cannot provide a unified discussion of important aspects of
American law; indeed, two of its three thematic chapters do no more
than suggest the contours of their basic themes. Nevertheless, the
work has an underlying motif; the problem of causation in legal history and, especially, ideas as causal or caused factors. This motif
guides White's quest for an alternative to the dominant characterization of legal study as the study of the "law's operational significance
for the institution of the market." 19 The effort to penetrate the problem of causation is important, for the problem is necessarily essential
to any explanation of history. And White is not alone among historians in urging renewed attention to the role of ideas in the causal
17. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
18. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967).
19. Seep. xviii (citing Hurst, The Law in United States History, 104 PROC. AM. PHIL, Soc.
518, 523 (1960)).
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chain; a large number of scholars arrayed all along the political spectrum have increasingly emphasized the importance of the legal system's intellectual aspects for resolving historical and contemporary
problems.
·
Patterns presents three aspects of the role of ideas: the significance of nonauthoritative intellectual l~ders, the significance of
judges, and the significance of a unique body of justices responsible
for interpreting a set of universal principles. The underlying issue is
where each of these groups fits in the causal nexus that involves economic, political, and social forces; the public, elite groups, and the
legal profession; and schools and principles of legal thought and aspects of technical legal doctrine. A growing body of literature explicitly addresses this issue, and it is implicitly explored in every
major piece of writing on legal history and the legal system. This is
not the place for a comprehensive survey of the various approaches
to the issue. I think it would be helpful, however, to discuss some
general approaches to the issue, to locate White's thinking within
those approaches, to suggest some of the implications of each approach, and finally to comment on the validity of each approach
and, therefore, on the contribution of Patterns:
We can identify two schools ·of thought on the causal position of
ideas. 20 Adherents of the orthodox approach to law and legal history21 regard ideas as primary in legal causation. Accordingly,
scholars and judges, as the developers of legal ideas, are the key to
legal causation. In this view, social reality is important only in providing the material that the legal system will shape. Historically this
idealist school has taken two basic forms, one concerning itself only
with autonomous, professional legal activity and the other emphasizing the functional role of law in shaping social behavior.
The second approach to the causal role of ideas contrasts strongly
with functionalist idealism. If law is interrelated with social practice,
then perhaps social practice is prior to law and not vice versa. Then
legal form and content would largely reflect external forces in society, the origins of legal ideas could be identified outside the legal
system, and the actions of scholars and judges would have little independent significance. A common form of this perspective is economic determinism, the belief that economic forces are directly
20. See Gordon, Introduction: J. Willard Hurst and the Common Law Tradition in American Legal Historiography, IO L. & SocY. REv. 9 (1975); Tushnet, Perspectives on the .Development of American Law: A Critical Review of Lawrence Friedman's •~ History of American
Law" 1977 Wis. L. REv. 81; Gordon, Some Thoughts on Legal Form and Social Practice in
American Legal Historiography (unpublished paper presented at the Second National Meeting,
Conference on Critical Legal Studies, Nov. I I, 1978); Holt, Morton Horw,~z and the Traneformation ofAmerican Legal History (1979) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Michigan
Law Review).
21. See Gordon, supra note 20; Horwitz, The Conservative Tradition in the Writing ofAmerican Legal History, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 275 (1973).
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correlated to legal practice. Economic determinism has a liberal variant, pluralist determinism, and a radical variant, quaintly called
vulgar instrumental Marxism.
This description of idealism and determinism, two major approaches to the role of ideas in legal history, encompasses crudely
but not too inaccurately much of the typical work in the discipline
until the recent resurgence of activity. Presently the discipline is
characterized by a diversity of fresh approaches to the issue of historical causation. The older traditions continue to thrive, but the
work most important to the present discussion responds to the determinist mode in two quite different directions. One response is a sophisticated, qualified idealism that restores ideas to a major but not
exclusive causal position; White is the leading member of this school.
A second response, a radical approach derived largely from modem
Marxist thinking, studies ideas, ideology, and consciousness in a materialist posture. By contrasting these two approaches, I hope to
make clear my critique of White's work in light of my sympathy for
the second approach.
White emphasizes two moving forces of legal history: institutional and doctrinal beliefs of the legal system, and larger cultural
attitudes and movements in social thought. Institutional norms constrain the judge's authority, for example, by requiring judges to follow approved techniques such as formally rational decisionmaking
and adherence to precedent. Judges filter these role constraints
through their own social and political inclinations, which by and
large reflect the social values generated by dominant intellectual patterns. Thus judicial law results from the interaction between ideas
embodied in the legal system and ideas embodied in the culture.
An example may be helpful. White rejects the traditional hypothesis that the development of tort law "must be laid at the door of
the industrial revolution";22 he favors a theory that internal and external intellectual forces raised a new system of law. In White's
view, the new group of cases was mere context; the true causal forces
were, internally, the necessity for a doctrinal recasting following the
collapse of tort law's prior organizing principle (writ pleading) and,
externally, the scientific, conceptual impulse among legal scholars
that typified the reigning intellectual class.
I consider it important that White, perhaps prima interpares, has
drawn our attention again to the intellectual history of the law as a
counterweight to the once prevalent pluralist determinism. However, because we still are in the early stages of the enterprise, criticism of White's theories is essential. Indeed, White invites such
criticism:
22. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 409. The traditional hypothesis has been criticized on
other grounds. See Tushnet, supra note 20, at 89-91.
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It seems to me that the relationship between dominant ideas or values
and "significant" events in the history of a profession is extraordinarily
complex and difficult to characterize. Events cannot categorically be
said to skew perceptions of events. Much more work and thought
needs to be done, in my judgment, before a theory of the interaction of
ideas and events in· the history of American legal thought can be proposed. [p. 97 .]

I believe that White's questions are important ones, but the method
by which he seeks the answers is unpromising.
White conveys an impression of social conditions as catalysts and
ideas as powerful, quasi-independent forces moving in history. His
is not a simple idealism, but it is, I think, idealism of some sort.
Take again his conclusions in his two principal areas of study.
White sees American tort law rising out of scientific conceptualism
and the collapse of the writ system as those two forces converged in
cases presented by the new industrial system, cases between strangers. But move back a step. What caused the collapse of the writ
system, and what caused the emergence of conceptualism as a dominant intellectual force? White rejects the view that the writ system
met its demise because of dissatisfaction with its obscure technicalities and because of the developing codification movement. He suggests instead that a social event, the enlargement of legal concerns in
the expanding economy, spurred the dissatisfaction, for as writ
pleading became more flexible and more complex, it also became
less useful to lawyers as an intellectual organizing device. 23 Thus,
like Ptolemaic astronomy, its complexity contributed to its rejection.
In the mid-nineteenth century, complexity and an emphasis on discrete rather than general solutions were especially offensive to the
movement toward scientism.
Where did that movement originate? Here White leaves us
somewhat at sea. In the early part of the century, he tells us, American intellectuals held both synthetic and atomistic views of law and
society, manifested in their acceptance of religious beliefs as an integrating force and in their awareness of the value of individual autonomy. After 1850, however, those beliefs were eroded by the
recognition of the disintegrative and alienating power of material
progress and the apparent irrelevance of earlier religious beliefs. But
White explains the emergence of the Victorian ethos no further.
I suppose a principal reason for White's failure to explore the
problem fully is the natural limit of the inquiry. Law review editors
and readers would probably rebel - and rightly so - at an extended discussion of the origins of Victorianism in an article on tort
law. Accordingly, White follows the accepted scholarly practice of
23. Cf. W. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW 69-87 (1975).

732

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 78:722

incorporation by footnote (p. 168 n.19). But for our purposes the
analysis must be extended to explicate its theoretical underpinings.
Before attempting that explication, let me state the second example. White describes Sociological Jurisprudence's attack on Mechanical Jurisprudence as the legal front in Progressivism's war on the
intellectual and political beliefs of the late nineteenth century. Further on in the story, as the morality and optimism of Progressivism
faded in the 1920s, the social sciences and then legal "science"
shifted their attention, leading to the rise of American Legal Realism. Thus again we are pressed back to explaining the rise and decline of Progressivism.
These examples share an emphasis on intellectual processes in
interpreting social phenomena. This is, of course, the essence of intellectual history. Given the sketchiness of the description, we can
speculate that White is here using one of two possible causal theories. The first is a determinist mode in which, for example, the chaos
of an expanding economy leads inexorably to an intellectual attempt
to organize the chaos according to scientific principles. Yet neither
White nor many others in the field would be likely to accept that
approach. In the second, an idealist mode, ideas and congeries of
belief are largely autonomous from social forces. Industrial capitalism does not produce Victorian conceptualism but creates a social
environment to be understood by intellectuals. In attempting to understand the environment, they exercise independent powers of reason to revise or replace prior modes of thought. But how would an
idealist say that a particular new intellectual zeitgeist is finally selected? If we reject determinism, two explanations remain. One is
that people through reasoning evolve answers that are increasingly
"correct." As a new situation is presented, they refine earlier ideas
and beliefs, and their knowledge becomes more sophisticated. This
position once dominated legal history and is still widely held. But
given the complexity of historical experience I reject it, as I think
White would, as inadequate. The other explanation is that the process is very complicated and subtle - perhaps incapable of accurate
definition. At a theoretical level that may very well be true, 24 but we
should not abandon all attempts at understanding just because total
understanding is beyond our reach. Further insight can be gained by
contrasting the idealist mode in general with another popular style of
explanation, materialism.
There is a crucial but often distorted difference between materialism, the mode of analysis unique to Marxism, and economic determinism, which has liberal as well as radical variants. 25 Unlike
economic determinism, materialism acknowledges the influence of
24._ See R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 8-23, 245-62 (1976).
25. In the following discussion I make extensive use of Holt, supra note 20; Tushnet, supra
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intelligence and belief on history. Yet unlike idealism, materialism
asserts the centrality of economic and social forces in history.
According to the materialist view of history, people seek to fulfill
their needs, primary among which are physical needs, by interacting
with others and developing technology. Collective activity, however,
is not always harmonious; it sometimes leads to conflict over the use
and control of the technologically available means of fulfillment
("means of production"). The relationship of these conflicts to the
means of production generates social relations ("modes of production") in which those in control of the means of production naturally
prefer to press their advantage at the expense of the subordinate
group. The members of the oppressed class, in tum, seek to fulfill
their needs by escaping their oppression. To forestall this possibility,
the controlling group promotes ideas and beliefs that disguise and
justify its position ("ideology"). The false ideology appears true as
an integrated explanation of experience, because experience is profoundly shaped by the mode of production. Ideas, therefore, are not
excluded from the materialist perception, but the dominance of ·particular ideas is explained by their service to the social relations of
domination and subordination.26
We are thus presented with two sophisticated views of the role of
ideas in history: qualified idealism and materialism. Both contrast
with the simplistic views of classical idealism and determinism.
Neither is susceptible t<? conclusive proof because of the inadequacies of historical evidence and historical method. Nevertheless, I
would draw certain tentative conclusions, the most important of
which is that neither can claim to offer a universal explanation. Too
much time has been spent in recent years defining the relation oflaw
and legal thought to social forces for us to avoid the conclusion that
ideas have only limited autonomy. On the other hand, the diversity
of intellectual experience and the existence of ideas obviously unrelated to the mode of production limits the position of materialism to
at most primacy and not universality.
I think that the choice between explanatory models is essentially
a political on~. White's idealist model directs our attention to intellectual processes, to the work of scholars, and to autonomous ideas,
leaving political and economic forces in the background. This
model, like earlier idealist approaches, views law as rational activity.
That view emphasizes the activities of academics, lawyers, and
judges within the legal system, especially the intellectual aspects of
note 20; and Tushnet, A Marxist Analysis of American Law, l MARxlsT PERSPECTIVES 96
(1978).
26. In this necessarily brief summary I do not mean to emphasize a conscious, conspiratorial element in the production of ideology. See text at notes 30-31 infra.
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their activity.27 It implicitly holds out the promise oflegal and social
reform through the power of sweet reason. It deemphasizes the effects of the conceptual schemes and doctrines on the non-elite consumers of the legal system's products.
The materialist model, on the other hand, attacks quite directly
questions of power, of truth, of human fulfillment, and of justice.
History in this view is not a succession of interesting intellectual
schema developing against a fuzzy background of social reform
movements. Instead, it is characterized by an ongoing conflict of
class against class. The legal system is seen as an arena in which the
conflict is played out. Sometimes the conflict is obvious, as in a
struggle over instrumental doctrinal rules. But a major contribution
of the materialist approach is its insight into the origins and roles of
aspects of legal thought that, on the surface, do not appear to be
involved in the class struggle.
Structures of belief thus play a major role in the model, although
not a primary role. Some of the most exciting current writing on law
in the Marxist tradition stresses the hidden power of the intellectual
constructs that originate in the class conflict. Such constructs should
not be viewed either in isolation or merely in relation to amorphous
social movements. They are intimately connected to fundamental
issues of right raised by the materialist critique. Further, materialism considers not only the content of law - doctrines, principles,
schools of jurisprudence - but also the legal form and legal order
itself.
A first use of ideas in law is to build legitimacy for the social
relations it protects.28 Legal ideology can be used to justify the state
of affairs in society to the dominated and to the dominating. Hegemony is maintained not by force alone but also by inducing acceptance
of values and institutions that appear to support an unequal distribution of power. Ideology will reduce dissatisfaction, or at least overt
resistance, to the extent that it penetrates the lower class consciousness. The most likely penetration is of general principles, such as the
neutrality of the legal system, rather than specific rules of law. For
the dominating class, and especially for lawyers serving the interests
of that class, legal ideology can reduce the cognitive dissonance that
arises from participating in a process whose results are manifestly
inconsistent with basic moral values. 29
Not only substantive legal principles but also the legal form generates ideology.30 Under capitalism the legal form is homologous to
27. The choice of the idealist model is also in this way self-justificatory.
28~ See Holt, supra note 20; Tushnet, supra note 20; Tushnet, supra note 25.
29. See R COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975);
Kennedy, The Structure ofBlackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 205 (1979).
30. Balbus, Commodity Form and Legal Form, 11 L. & Socv. REV. 571 (1977).
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the commodity form. The commodity form conceals the qualitative
differences between the exchange values of two products and therefore the products' origins in human labor and the relations of capitalist and worker. Similarly, the legal form, the notion of impersonal
equality before the law, conceals the qualitatively different nature of
individuals who come before the law and the social relations that
bring them there. Thus the capitalist legal order convincingly substitutes formal equality, liberty, and political community for the genuine, experiential forms of those values, thereby discouraging
challenges to the existing social order. Autonomy of the legal system
from direct pressure by political or economic interests does not imply neutrality: a deeper look at the role of ideology in legal history is
necessary.
Delineating the connection between the mode of production and
the ideology of the legal order is perhaps the most difficult task in
developing a theory of causation. Because legal form and content
are not always generated consciously by manipulative ruling-class
ideologues, delineating the connection requires a legal phenomenology as part of legal history. 31 This approach considers people's attempt to interpret their material and social experience by developing
integrated theoretical structures. The law's approach to problems reflects those attempts and structures. Because economic relations are
the primary elements of this experience, law corresponds to those
relations. Thus, consciousness shapes law, but in a sophisticated and
attenuated fashion with the mode of production as a touchstone.
While this approach resembles White's in its view of the relation of
legal ideas to cultural values, it has the advantages of more emphasis
on the nature of the causal link and a closer relation between law
and social forces.

III. CONCLUSION
Professor White is to be commended for raising the issue of the
role of ideas in the history of the American legal system. Given the
ostensible devotion of the system to cerebration, the importance of
intellectual processes is clear and the attention paid to them is deserved. Raising issues and resolving them are two different things,
however. White's work is exceptional but ultimately unsatisfying.
On intellectual grounds, it fails to consider fully the relation of legal
ideas to social forces, and the place of ideas in the causal nexus of
legal history. Such breadth and depth are too much to be demanded
of any single scholar. On personal grounds, however, it fails to direct attention to issues of justice, the basic issues legal scholars must
confront. On both grounds, in my judgment, further research will be
3 I. See Gabel, Intention and Structure in Contractual Conditions: Outline of' a Methodfar
Critical Legal Theory, 61 MINN. L. REv. 601 (1977) ..
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more fruitful if it considers the issues raised by the modem adherents of the Marxist tradition.

